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3,5,10

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2) (e) , Utah Code
Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE I. IS YOUNG'S "EVIDENCE" OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL ADMISSIBLE BEFORE THIS COURT?
Because

the trial

court did not hold an

evidentiary

hearing in this case, and Young did not file a motion for a
remand pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah R. App. P., the issues of
this case should be decided on the trial record.

However,

Young bases much of her brief on post-trial evidence which she
submitted by way of affidavits supporting a motion for a new
trial.

Because of the nature of this evidence, its use on

appeal should be considered under the appropriate rule of
evidence regarding the admissibility of hearsay, Rule 802,
Utah Rules of Evidence.

The evidence should also be subject

to the law prohibiting

the submission of new evidence on

appeal. State v. Bredehoft,

966P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1998).

ISSUE II.

Utah

has

DID THE DEFENDANT RECEIVE COMPETENT LEGAL
REPRESENTATION AT TRIAL?
adopted

the

two

prong

Strickland

test

analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
1
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for
State

v.

Perry,

899

Washington,
Strickland
legal

P.2d

1332

(Utah App.

1995);

Strickland

v.

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Under the
test, the appellant must first demonstrate that her

counsel's

representation

standard of reasonableness.

fell

below

an

objective

The appellant must then show

that, but for her counsel's unprofessional errors there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would
have been different.

To prevail, the appellant must meet both

prongs of the Strickland

test.

Fernandez

v.

Cook,

870 P.2d

870 (Utah 1993).
The appropriate standard of review of trial counsel's
choices regarding trial strategy is deference, even if the
choices are incorrect in hindsight.
2d 461

(Utah

App.

1993).

State

v.

Tennyson,

850 P.

The appropriate standard of review

of a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new

trial based

upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is deference
to the trial courts findings of fact, but review of its legal
conclusions for correctness. Perry,

at page 1238

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCE, AND RULES
Amendment VI, United States Constitution.

(

2
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed,

which

district

shall

have

been

previously

ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense.
Rule 802., Utah Rules of Evidence.
Hearsay

Rule.

Hearsay

is not

admissible

except

as

provided by law or by these rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a prosecution and conviction for a
violation of Section 41-la-201, U.C.A., Registration Required
and

Section

76-5-102.4, U.C.A.,

Assault

Against

a

Peace

Officer.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On or about February 13, 1998, Cindy Lou Young ("Young")
was arrested and booked into jail for Assault Against a Peace
Officer, Expired Vehicle Registration, and Violation of a
Protective Order, Section 76-5-108 U.C.A. (Record, page 1.).
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

An information charging those three misdemeanor crimes was
filed with the court on March 27, 1998. (Record, page 9.) On
October

18, 1998, an Amended

dropped

the

charge

(Record, page 42.)

of

Information was

Violation

of

a

filed which

Protective

Order.

On October 18, 1998, a jury trial was held

before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn of the Third District
Court.

Young was represented at trial by David R. Maddox.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT

At trial, the jury convicted Young of Assault Against a
Peace Officer and Expired Vehicle Registration. (Record, page
46.)

Young was sentenced

to pay a fine of $500 and was

sentenced to a jail term of 45 days, which was suspended.

She

was also put on probation to the court for a period of 12
months

and

required

to

attend

anger

management

classes.

(Record, page 73.)
On

January

19, 1999, Young's

new

counsel,

Delano

S.

Findlay, filed a Motion for a New Trial. (Record, page 108.)
The

basis

counsel.

for

this motion

ineffective

assistance

of

On March 2, 1999, a hearing on the motion was held

before Judge Paul Maughan.
consisted

was

of

the

evidentiary hearing.

The hearing before Judge Maughan

arguments

of

counsel

and

was

(Hearing Transcript, pages 5-6.)

4
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not

an

Judge

Maughan issued his Conclusions of Law and Order on June 21,
1999, which denied Young's Motion for a New Trial. (Record,
page 146.)
Notice of Appeal in this case was filed on July 1, 1999.
(Record, page 167.)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The City accepts the Statement of Facts set forth in
Young's brief with the following exception.
The "facts'" set forth in paragraphs 8, 13, 14, and 18 are
not facts based upon the record of this case.

Each of these

"facts" presented by Young is based solely or partially on
affidavits presented to Judge Maughan in support of Young's
Motion for a New Trial. Such affidavits are inappropriate for
use in this appellate proceeding. State
285

(Utah

App.

1998).

In

v. Bredehoft,

addition,

while

966 P. 2d

all

of

the

affidavits contain hearsay, the Affidavit of Counsel (Record,
pages 110-112.), is virtually entirely hearsay.

It relates

the purported testimony of a potential witness, as told to
Young's

appellate

counsel.

Such

hearsay

statements

inadmissable under Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence.

5
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are

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

MUCH OF YOUNG'S EVIDENCE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL IS NOT ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
'COURT OF APPEALS.

Much of the evidence upon which Young bases her appeal is
contained in three affidavits and their attachments.

The

affidavits are of the Appellant Young (Record, pages 79-107.),
her counsel on appeal Delano S. Findlay (Record, pages 110114.), and a trial witness Bobbi Johnson (Record, pages 115117.).

The evidence contained in these affidavits were not

taken as evidence before the trial court, contain hearsay, and
contain evidence that would be considered to be new evidence
on appeal.

These affidavits should be disregarded by the

Court of Appeals and the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel should be treated as if raised for the first time on
appeal.
II.

YOUNG RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF A VIGOROUS AND
COMPETENT DEFENSE WHICH RESULTED IN A JUST AND FAIR
TRIAL.

Young's argument of ineffective assistance of counsel
must be measured against the two prong test set forth in
i

Strickland
(1984).
trial

v.

Washington,

466 U.S.

668, 104

S. Ct. 2052

That test requires that Young demonstrate that her
counsel's

representation

fell

below

6
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an

objective

<

standard of reasonableness and that, but for her counsel's
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that
the outcome of the trial would have been different.
v.

Cook,

870 P. 2d 870

(Utah 1993).

either prong of the Strickland

Fernandez

Young cannot satisfy

test.

First, the perceived errors that she asserts are all
legitimate trial strategy decisions made by her trial counsel.
Such decisions are given great deference by appellate courts.
State

v.

Tennyson,

850

P.2d

461

(Utah App.

1993) ("If

a

rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated,
we will assume counsel acted competently."). Second, Young has
not shown that the outcome of the trial would have likely been
different had her trial counsel presented the

"additional

evidence" she believes he should have presented.'

To the

contrary, almost all of her "additional evidence" relates to
her arrest and to the aftermath of being sprayed with pepper
spray.
since

This is unrelated to the core of the City's case,
the assault on Officer

Lozano consisted

of Young's

kicking and fingernail digging which occurred prior to the use
of pepper spray or the arrest.

7
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

MUCH
OF
YOUNG'S
EVIDENCE
OF
INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE
OF
COUNSEL
IS
NOT
ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS.

Virtually all of the evidence upon which Young rests her
argument of ineffective assistance of counsel are based upon
evidence
Motion

which

for

affidavits

a

she
New

submitted
Trial.

to

This

the

trial

evidence

from the Appellant Young

court

was

with

submitted

her
by

(Record, pages79-107 . ) ,

her counsel on appeal Delano S. Findlay

(Record, pages 110-

114.), and a trial witness Bobbi Johnson

(Record, pages 115-

117.).

These affidavits contained information that was not:

taken as evidence before the trial court (Hearing Transcript,
Pages 5-6.), contain hearsay, and contain evidence that would
be considered to be new evidence on appeal.

These affidavits

should not form the basis for a decision of this Court and the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel should be treated
as if raised for the first time on appeal.
The status of this case before the Court Of Appeals is
somewhat unique.

Usually ineffective assistance of counsel

arguments are either made following a Rule 23B, Utah R. App.
P., Motion to Remand

for an evidentiary

hearing before

the

trial court; following an evidentiary hearing on a post trial

8
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motion; following an evidentiary hearing on a habeas corpus
petition; or they are sometimes heard for the first time on
appeal when the record below is considered to be adequate.
This case does not fall neatly into any of these categories.
In this case, there was a motion for a new trial heard by
the trial court below.

However, the trial court did not

conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

Therefore,

Young's trial counsel was not questioned regarding either his
strategic decisions, or his investigations and preparations
for trial. The result is the bare trial record accompanied by
affidavits and

proffers of evidence made before the court at

the motion hearing.
These

affidavits

and

proffers

are

not

appropriately

considered to be evidence in the appellate process.
v.

Bredehoft,

966 P.2d

285 (Utah App. 1998),

In

State

the Court of

Appeals did not allow the appellant to rely on unsubstantiated
allegations contained in affidavits submitted to support a
Rule 23B motion.
this case.

That is very analogous to the situation in

The affidavits referred to by Young in her brief

were submitted in support of a Motion for a New Trial, based
upon an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
virtually identical to the Bredehoft

This is

case and for the same

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reasons articulated in that case the affidavits should not be
considered in this case.

Bredehoft,

at page 290.

A second reason for disregarding the information in the
Affidavit of Counsel (Record, pages 110-114.),is the fact that
it is replete with inadmissable hearsay.

For example, in

paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of his affidavit, counsel
describes EMT Glezos' recollection of the incident as told to
him by Glezos over the telephone.

This information is hearsay

and is not admissible as evidence in either this Court or the
trial court pursuant to Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Finally, much of the information relied upon by Young is
vx

new" evidence before this Court.

The information contained

in the affidavits was not part of the testimony at trial and
was not produced at an evidentiary hearing before 'the trial
court.

It is well established that appellate courts of this

state will not consider new evidence on appeal.

Bredehoft,

at

P.290.
The information contained in the affidavits should be
disregarded for purposes of this appeal and the Court should
treat the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel as if
raised for the first time on appeal.
(

10
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II.

YOUNG RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF A VIGOROUS AND
COMPETENT DEFENSE WHICH RESULTED IN A JUST AND FAIR
TRIAL.

Young argues that she received inadequate assistance of
counsel at trial.

This argument is based on the underlying

concept that her counsel's performance was so deficient that
she was deprived of counsel for her defense as guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

A

close review of the facts below revealed that her argument is
without merit.
Utah has adopted the analytical framework set forth by
the

United

States

Supreme

Court

for deciding

ineffective

assistance of counsel claims under the Sixth Amendment.
v.

Perry,

899 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995).

set forth in Strickland
Ct. 2052(1984).

v. Washington,

In Strickland,

State

This framework is

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.

The United States Supreme

Court set forth a two prong test for analyzing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.
the Strickland

To satisfy the first part of

test, a defendant must show that the trial

counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.

Strickland,

466 U.S. 668, 688.

The second

prong of the test is satisfied if the defendant can show that
there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's

11
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unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.
Baker,

Strickland,

466 U.S. 668, 694; State

963 P.2d 801 (Utah App. 1998).

Strickland
fail.

v.

If either prong of the

test is not established, defendant's claim will
Strickland,

466 U.S. 668, 687; State v.

Tennyson,

850

p.2d 461(Utah App.1993).
As is set forth below, Young has failed both prongs of
the test. The analysis, which assumes rhat Young's affidavits
and proffers are admissible evidence, is set forth below.
A.

THE ACTIONS OF YOUNG'S TRIAL COUNSEL
INVOLVED TRIAL STRATEGY DECISIONS THAT ARE
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE.

Utah law creates a strong presumption of competence by
defense counsel.

In reviewing defense counsel's actions, the

court does not need to come to a conclusion that counsel had
a specific strategy in mind it simply needs to be able to
articulate some plausible strategic explanation for defense
counsel's actions. Tennyson,

at

P.468.

The presumption of competence is so strong that the Utah
Court

of

counsel's

Appeals

has

performance

stated:
can be

"If

a

rational

articulated,

basis

we will

for

assume

counsel acted competently.

Indeed, authority from this court

supports

an

the notion

that

ineffective

assistance

12
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claim

succeeds

only

when

no

conceivable

legitimate

tactic

or

Tennyson,

strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions."

at P.468. It is also clear from the case law that "Although
defense counsel must vigorously represent his or her client,
^counsel

[is]

not

required

to

develop

every

defense that [is] available.'" State v. Baker,

conceivable
963 P.2d 801

(Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted) .
Young's first allegation of inadequate representation is
that her trial counsel failed to interview and call certain
witnesses that she believed would corroborate

her testimony.

These witnesses were Anthony Glezos, an EMT with the West
Valley City Fire Department, the tow truck driver who had
impounded her van, and her neighbor Bobbi Johnson.

In each

case, there is a plausible strategic explanation for trial
counsel's actions.
First, with respect to EMT Glezos, all information before
the court with respect to Glezos consists of hearsay contained
in

an

affidavit

(Record,

pages

submitted
110-114.)

by

Young's

Assuming

appellate
this

counsel.

hearsay

to

be

accurate, it appears that Glezos was subpoenaed to appear
(Record, pages

40-41.) and did speak with trial counsel.

Following Glezos discussion with trial counsel, trial counsel

13
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made the conscious decision to not call Glezos as a witness.
Because of a lack of the factual evidence in the record, the
reason

for

Glezos

determined.

being

excused

cannot

be

conclusively

However, there are several plausible strategic

reasons why this occurred.

It appears from both the proffer

of evidence contained in the affidavit

(Record, pages 110-

114.) and from Officer Lozano's testimony at trial

(Trial

Transcript, page 96.), that Glezos may have testified that he
observed the injuries to Officer Lozano's fingers, that he
gave advice on how to treat the injuries, and that he provided
Lozano with a bandage (Hearing Transcript, page 12.). Given
the fact that Young testified that she did not inflict any
injuries to Lozano's hand, this portion of Glezos testimony
had

the

potential

Therefore

to

support

the

prosecution's

a decision not to call Glezos

case.

as a witness is

legitimately within the realm of trial strategy.
With
devoid

respect
of

any

to the tow truck driver,
evidence

concerning

the record is

trial

counsel's

investigation or decisions involving the tow truck driver.
Young states in her brief that trial counsel did not interview
the tow truck driver prior to the beginning of the trial.
("Appellant's

Brief,

p. 14.)

However,

that

statement

is
i

14
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unsupported by any information or evidence contained in the
record.

Since it is obvious that the tow truck driver arrived

a considerable time after the assault had occurred, trial
counsel

may

have

determined

that

the

driver

had

little

relevant evidence to add to Young's case.
The evidence regarding the testimony of Bobbi Johnson
indicates

that

she

was

subpoenaed

to

trial

and

she

was

interviewed prior to trial by trial counsel.

Unfortunately

for

under

Young,

Johnson's

examination.

testimony

fell

apart

cross-

There is simply no indication from the record

that Johnson's testimony would have been different or more
coherent had she spent more time being interviewed by trial
counsel.

Also, Johnson did not observe the assault on Officer

Lozano.

Her testimony was that she started watching after

Young had been pepper sprayed.

(Trial Transcript, pages 112,

117.)
Young relies on the case of State
182

(Utah

1990),

for

the proposition

v.

Templin,

that

805 P.2d

Young's

counsel failed to adequately investigate the witnesses.
reliance is misplaced.

In Templin,

trial
This

the court found that the

defendant's counsel had not spoken with or subpoenaed several
key witnesses.

That is not the case here. In this case,

15
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Young's trial counsel subpoenaed both Bobbi Johnson and EMT
Glezos. (Record, pages 38-41.)
EMT

Glezos

was

excused

Johnson testified at trial and

after being

interviewed

by

trial

counsel, clearly a strategic decision. The only mystery is the
tow truck driver, and the record contains no evidence as to
any discussions trial counsel may have had with the tow truck
driver or whether or not he was subpoenaed to trial.
the counsel in Templin,

Unlike

Young's trial counsel subpoenaed and

interviewed the appropriate witnesses.
Young's second assertion of ineffective assistance of
counsel relates to the allegation that trial counsel failed to
investigate

the effects of pepper spray thereby

Young of an alternative explanation
being handcuffed.

depriving

for her resistance to

This allegation is simply not supported by

the record.
There was evidence presented

through both the direct

testimony and cross-examination of Officer Kishiyama regarding
the effect of pepper spray. ("Trial Transcript, pages 57-59.)
Also, Young testified about the effect of the pepper spray on
her. (Trial Transcript, pages 141-142.)

Trial counsel argued

the exact issue now being raised as an omission on appeal
I
16
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during both his opening and closing arguments. During opening
argument he stated:
"My client did struggle at that point because of
the affect of the mace. In fact, she'll testify,
she has no clear recollection of anything that
happened since the time she was maced in the face
because of the pain that she was in from the
chemical burning until she was on the grass with
another police officer standing over her at some
point later.
She doesn't know what happened in
between." ("Trial Transcript, page 48.)
During closing argument, trial counsel stated:
"At that point, things escalate one step
further. My client says that while they were bent
over, the officer reached around and, blam, nailed
her with the pepper spray, the OC spray. Got it in
her eyes and her mouth and everything.
It was a
heavy dose. And, frankly, she doesn't remember a
whole lot after that. She was nauseated, she was
sick, she was blinded, she had mucus running all
over her face, tears coming out of her eyes. And
that is what the officer said happens when you
pepper spray somebody." (Trial Transcript, page
200. )
Also during closing argument defense counsel stated:
"There's two very real alternatives about what
happened here. And under the second alternative of
what happened, did she assault a peace officer? Did
she make an attempt with unlawful force or violence
to do bodily injury to another? Or was she reacting
after being pepper sprayed in the face and flailing
around
because
of
the burns
and pain,
the
excruciating pain, she was feeling in her face? Is
that what was going on?"
(Trial Transcript, page
206. )
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Trial

counsel also stated

grabbed the keys.

"and my client

That's not an assault. And everything else

occurred after she got pepper sprayed".
page 207.)

froze up and

(Trial Transcript

Any additional evidence regarding the effects of

pepper spray would have merely added to the similar evidence
already before the jury.
Young's

third

allegation

of error

is that

her

trial

counsel failed to put on evidence concerning the charge of
violation of a protective order that had been filed by Officer
Lozano and then dismissed prior to trial.

According to her

argument, informing the jury of the filing of this charge
which was later dismissed may have raised questions in the
minds of the jurors regarding Lozano's mind set at the time of
arrest.
The record

is devoid of any evidence regarding

trial

counsel's investigation or involvement in the dismissal of
this charge.

However, there is an obvious strategic reason

for not raising this issue before the jury.

According to the

evidence proffered by Young's appellate counsel at the motion
for a new trial, he indicates that the protective order was
issued as a result of a physical altercation with her exhusband which he described as "this little so called slapping
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incident, which

there

was

a little

slapping,

for vulgar

language, on the mouth, not very hard or forceful, but there
was a little slap".

(Motion Transcript, page 27.)

This

information obviously would have come to light and, although
the protective order was later dismissed, it is clear that a
protective order had been issued by the District Court. Trial
counsel was left with the decision to weigh the benefit of
showing a potential bias by Lozano, against the potential harm
of admitting that his client had been involved in a previous
physical altercation that had resulted in the issuance of a
court order against her. Such a decision clearly falls within
the realm of trial strategy and should not be questioned on
review.

This is particularly true given the extremely slight

evidentiary value of this evidence.

Since the charges were

filed after the incident, it is only evidence of Lozano's mind
set after she had been assaulted by Young, not before.
The

final error asserted by Young

is that her trial

counsel's failure to plead to the Expired Registration charge
prior to trial painted her in an unfavorable light before the
jury.

Once again, there is an obvious strategic reason for

trial counsel's action.

It is entirely plausible that it was

trial counsel's intention to allow the jury the option of
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convicting Young on the lesser charge of Expired Registration
while finding her not guilty of Assault on a Police Officer.
With both charges available to them, the jury had the option
of reaching a verdict in essentially what would be the "middle
ground".

By pleading to the Expired Registration charge prior

to trial, Young would be forcing the jury into an all or
nothing decision.

This trial strategy makes perfect sense

when one considers that all of the evidence regarding Expired
Registration would most likely been presented at trial anyway,
since the City would have had to provide a basis for the
traffic

stop

and

explained

the events

leading

up

to

the

assault by Young.
Young's argument that she may have appeared to the jury
to be unreasonably fighting all • of the charges is also in
conflict with her testimony at trial.

At trial she did not

dispute the registration charge but instead readily admitted
that she had committed a violation.

(Trial Transcript, pages

148-149. )
B.

THE JURY'S VERDICT IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED AND
ANY ALLEGED ERRORS BY YOUNG'S TRIAL COUNSEL DID
NOT AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL.

If, for the sake of argument, the actions of Young's
trial counsel are considered to have fallen below a reasonable
(
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level of competence, Young can still not satisfy the second
prong

of

the

Strickland

test.

In

order

to

requirements of the second prong of the Strickland

meet

the

test, Young

must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been

Strickland,

different."

466

U.S.

668,

694.

In

determining whether or not this standard has been met, the
Utah Court of Appeals has stated:
NX

In deciding whether a case should be remanded for
retrial on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel, 'an appellate court should consider the
totality of the evidence, taking into account such
factors as whether the errors effect the entire
evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and
how strongly the verdict is supported by the
record.'"
State v.

Strain,

Templin,

805 P. 2d

885 P. 2d 810 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting
at 187.)

In this case, the verdict is strongly supported by the
evidence presented at trial.

Even taken in their best light,

as errors, rather than strategic decisions, the actions of
Young's trial counsel related only to minor evidentiary issues
and did not attack the strength of the City's case.
At
Lozano

the core of the City' s case
regarding

Young's

assault.

is the

Lozano

testimony

testified
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of

that

Young's first action constituting an assault was a kick to
Lozano's

chest.

(Trial

Transcript,

pages

87,90.)

This

testimony is not effected by any of the perceived errors now
being

alleged

by Young.

Lozano

also

testified

that

her

fingers were injured by Young digging her fingernails into
Lozano

during

the

struggle

for

the

car

keys.

(Trial

Transcript, pages 88-90.)
Young now argues that her trial counsel was deficient in
not presenting

a medical

expert

nature of the injuries to her hand.
this medical

to testify

regarding

the

However, the testimony of

expert would have been of little benefit to

Young, he expert's information contained in Young's affidavit
confirms
fingers.

that

Lozano

did

indeed

suffer

an

injury

to her

This directly contradicts the testimony, of Young

that V\I do not recall grabbing Miss-- Officer Lozano's hands".
(Trial

Transcript,

page

156.)

The

fact

that

an

injury

occurred is also supported in the evidence by the testimony of
both Officer Kishiyama and Officer Moore who testified they
observed the injury to Lozano's hand when they arrived on the
scene.

(Trial Transcript, pages 55,72.)

Finally, Young's

\

other potential witness, EMT Glezos, would have presumably
further buttressed the prosecution's position by testifying
i
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that he had observed the injuries to Lozano, advised her how
to care for the injury, and provided her with a bandaid.
(Trial Transcript, page 96; Record, pages 110-114; Hearing
Transcript, page 12).
Young's

arguments

regarding

the

failure to call EMT

Glezos, the tow truck driver, and adequately interview Bobbi
Johnson, all reflect instances which, even if they are to be
considered to be errors, did not effect the outcome of the
trial.
would

For example, the proffered testimony of EMT Glezos
have

testimony.

at

most

produced

two

additional

pieces

of

Glezos presumably would have testified that he

observed no blood on Young and that Young was kneeling on the
ground,

in handcuffs, when he arrived.

Neither of these

pieces of evidence strike at the core of the City's case, nor
do they add any evidence that was not already produced at
trial.

Bobbi Johnson testified that she observed Young lying

face down on the ground (Trial Transcript, pages 109,119.),
Young testified that she was kneeling (Trial Transcript, page
142.), and the officers testified that she was sitting (Trial
Transcript, pages 55,71,93.).

This issue, which is certainly

not central to the crime committed, was already in dispute
before the jury.
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Similarly,

there

was

already

Testimony

from

a

City

witness, Officer Moore, that he did not observe any blood on
Young (Trial Transcript, page 72.).

It's not surprising that

some people at the scene did not see the relatively small
amount of blood on Young, which Officer Lozano described as "a
couple

of

dots''

(Trial

Transcript,

page

96.).

Glezos'

testimony would not have produced evidence other than that
already produced at trial.

When the defendant has failed to

demonstrate how further investigation by council would have
produced evidence other than that already presented at trial,
the defendant has failed to demonstrate how the additional
investigation

would

have

provided

the

defendant

with

sufficient information to alter the outcome of the trial.
State

v.

Baker,

963 P. 2d 801(Utah App. 1998).

The testimony of Bobbi Johnson and the tow truck driver
were likewise not critical to the outcome of this trial.

It

is clear from her testimony that Bobbi Johnson did not see
Young's assault on Officer Lozano.
portions of the aftermath.

At best she saw certain

Since the description

of the

aftermath and the arrest have nothing to do with the offense,
her

testimony would not have affected

trial.

the outcome of the

Similarly, the tow truck driver arrived on the scene
(
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after the crime had occurred and any testimony that he or she
may have provided would have been of little value.
Young's argument regarding the failure to investigate and
present the effect of pepper spray on the defendant also would
not have produced evidence other than that already presented
at trial.

Officer Kishiyama, Officer Moore, and Young all

testified as to the effects of pepper spray.

Further, Young's

trial counsel argued and described the effects of pepper spray
in both his opening and closing argument.
appellant in the Baker

Much like the

case, cited above, Young has failed to

demonstrate how additional investigation of the effects of
pepper spray would have produced evidence other than that
already presented at trial and how that additional evidence
would have effected the outcome of the trial.

Baker,

at

P.808.
Finally, Young alleges that her trial counsel's decision
not to raise the protective order violation and decision to
not plead to the Expired Registration charge were both errors
by her trial counsel.

In her brief however, she gives little

explanation as to how these perceived

failures would have

caused the results of the trial to be different.
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At best,

each of these issues has the ability to cut both ways, both in
favor of, and against Young's case.
For example, informing the jury that the protective order
violation had been erroneously charged by Officer Lozano would
have resulted in the jury also being informed that Young had
been involved in a physical altercation with her ex-husband,
however

minor

that

physical

altercation

may

have

been.

Similarly, the failure to plead to the charge of driving on
Expired Registration would have removed that charge from the
jury's deliberations, however it woulo have also limited the
possible outcomes of the trial. The potential

for finding

guilt on txhe Expired Registration and acquittal on the Assault
on a Police Officer, clearly a result that would have been
more beneficial to Young, would have been eliminated.

Neither

of these strategic decisions by Young's trial counsel have
anything to do with the charge of Assault on a Police Officer,
nor did they affect the outcome of this trial.

CONCLUSION

The evidence relied upon by Young is not properly before
this Court and should be disregarded.

It consists of hearsay

and new evidence contained in affidavits that were filed with
I
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the trial court in support of a Motion

for a New Trial.

However, even if this information was admissible, it is still
obvious that Young had competent legal counsel at trial and
that her trial was fair.
All of the errors alleged by Young can be explained as
obvious strategic decisions made by her trial counsel.

Her

trial counsel actively and aggressively defended Young at
trial.

He

fully

participated

in

jury

selection.

He

subpoenaed the appropriate witnesses, although he chose not to
use certain witnesses.
City's witnesses.

He aggressively cross-examined the

He offered appropriate objections both

during the trial and following closing argument.

And, he

passionately pleaded the facts of the case in both his opening
and closing arguments.

Young's trial counsel's performance

did not fall below a reasonable level of competence in this
case .
A review of the record also reveals that Young was not
prejudiced by the actions of her trial counsel.

Even if all

of the evidence she perceives as being critical had been
admitted at trial, the outcome of the trial would not have
changed.

The clear focus of the purported additional evidence

is on the arrest and it's aftermath.

With the exception of
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the evidence of the medical expert, none of this additional
evidence has anything to do with the crimes she committed.
With respect to the medical expert, at best his testimony
would have disputed the extent of the injury to Lozano, not
that an injury did or did not occur.

The fact that Lozano

suffered an injury was supported by substantial evidence at
trial.

None of the issues raised by Ycung would have effected

the outcome of the trial below.
Young
Strickland

has

failed

to

satisfy

either

prong

of

the

test for ineffective assistance of counsel.

She

was more than adequately represented by counsel, her trial was
fair, and the results of that trial should be affirmed by this
court.
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